Abstract: How party strategies vary by electoral systems remains largely unexplored in election studies. Using a comparative statics analysis with qualitative and quantitative data from Spanish national and European elections, we test how party strategies vary across two different electoral systems. We use the number of visits to districts by the party leaders of the main Spanish political parties to determine if targeted party strategies are driven by district magnitude, the share of the population entitled to vote in every district, the number of districts and/or the district-level electoral competitiveness. Our results show that the frequency of visits to districts by party leaders is clearly affected by electoral systems, mainly by the number of districts and district population.
Introduction
Contemporary representative democracies hinge on elections. Put in a parsimonious way, through their vote, citizens decide which policies they want implemented and which politicians to put in charge of their implementation. However, voting is a "not so simple act" (Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993: 193) , but the result of a causal chain with several links and actors involved. First, citizens' choices cannot be understood without first attending to the existing supply of parties or, more specifically, to the entry decisions made by party elites. Before the election occurs, and mainly based on their chances of winning seats, political parties have to decide at the local and national level whether they enter the race alone, engage in some form of pre-electoral coordination or stay out. Second, those parties entering have to define their campaign strategies to influence voters' decisions. That is, they have to make policy proposals and explain how these policies would affect citizens' welfare, allocate their resources across districts and select their candidates. Finally, citizens have to decide whether they vote or stay home, first, and second, those who vote have to choose a given party. Surprisingly, while the conventional wisdom, embodied in the M + 1 rule, has established that entry and voting are crucially affected by electoral systems (Cox, 1997) , we know much less about to what extent the strategies adopted by political parties in election campaigns are shaped by electoral systems. Few studies have examined the strategies adopted by political parties in election campaigns (Leighley, 1995) and, with some remarkable exceptions (Cox, 1999; Karp, Banducci and Bowler, 2007) , how party strategies vary by electoral system remains largely unexplored. For instance, when developing a multidimensional indicator of professionalized campaigning based on ten observable practices, Gibson and Römmele (2009) do not consider whether parties allocate their limited resources in an optimal way across districts in a particular election.
Additionally, in all these comparative studies party strategies are considered as independent variables instead of dependent variables; they examine the effectiveness of voter mobilization strategies or how successful parties are at mobilizing voters under different electoral systems, but not how party strategies vary across electoral systems. In sum, a parsimonious empirical model explaining how parties define their campaign strategies to influence voters' decisions is still lacking. There are at least two implications of this gap. First, if party strategies vary across countries and/or districts within countries depending on the different incentives provided by electoral systems, it is not possible to infer from election results or any proxy of campaign strategies as party contacting how effective campaign strategies are. To determine if campaigning is more effective in single-member plurality (SMP) electoral systems than in proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, for instance, we have to know which kind of campaign efforts take place in each type of electoral system. If party strategies differ across electoral systems, not controlling for this difference would bias the results of cross-national studies as a consequence of a problem of endogeneity. Second, if campaigning varies across countries and/or districts, electoral behaviour cannot be convincingly explained by various individual and contextual determinants, that is, forgetting the second link in the causal chain: the model would be misspecified.
The goal of this paper is to examine how electoral systems shape campaign strategies (i.e., the actions taken by parties to influence voters' decisions) through a proper comparative statics analysis. We use qualitative and quantitative data from national (Lower House) and European elections in Spain to determine whether visits to districts in the election campaign by the leaders of the main national parties is driven by district magnitude, the share of the population entitled to vote in every district, the number of districts and/or the district-level electoral competitiveness. While the 350 members of the Lower House are elected in 52 districts in which magnitude ranges from 1 to 36, the 50 seats in the European Parliament are elected in a single national district, using the D´Hondt method of proportional representation with closed lists in both cases.
Our findings show that the frequency of visits to districts by party leaders are clearly affected by electoral systems, mainly by the number of districts and district population.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section the previous literature and our theoretical arguments on how electoral systems shape campaign strategies are shown. The third section describes our case study, data and methods. The fourth and fifth sections discuss the results of the empirical analysis. Section six presents our conclusions and suggestions for further research.
Arguments
According to the conventional wisdom, as electoral rules affect the translation from mobilization efforts to votes, seats and portfolios, election campaigns vary across electoral systems and the degree of salience of the election (Katz, 1980) . Based on comparative statics conjectures, Cox (1999: 412- Surprisingly, very few studies have empirically examined how the strategies adopted by parties are shaped by electoral systems. As is well known, a substantial body of literature has demonstrated the efficacy of party canvassing, particularly spending, on mobilizing voters. For instance, in a recent piece using data from a three-wave panel survey for the 2010 British general election, Johnston et al (2011) show that parties focus their mobilization efforts in the last weeks before an election on those in marginal districts that are likely to vote for them, and that such tactics are successful; the more ways in which respondents were contacted by a party, the more likely they were to vote for it. Additionally, we know that the impact of district campaigning varies by electoral context depending on four elements: the competitiveness of the election, whether a significant change in an election is anticipated, the degree of coordination of campaigns (namely a function of the number of target seats), and the 'national mood', i.e., the popularity of a given party (Fisher et al, 2011: 917-818) 1 .
However, most previous research on party strategies in election campaigns looks at the decision that party elites take in individual elections in isolation or at best in a sequence of campaigns within the context of a single country, mainly in Britain and the implication of these single country studies is that the electoral system is a constant and therefore it is not possible to know whether the factors found to influence campaigns are idiosyncratic to that electoral system or can be generalized to other electoral systems. In one of the few studies to examine how party mobilization varies by electoral system, Karp et al (2007) In sum, the strategy is based on a proper comparative statics analysis concerning how mobilization changes when electoral institutions change. This is similar to Cox's approach (1999) , but using real evidence instead of hypothetical values or conjectures.
Given that data on how parties allocated their funds by province during the 2009 and 2011 election campaigns are not available, the frequency of visits to each province by party leaders will be the measure of the amount of effort parties devoted to mobilization. As the face of the campaign, the leader naturally garners significant media attention which means a targeted effort should reap extensive regional and local exposure. Modern and effective election campaigns are increasingly nationalized, centralized and a leader-dominated affair (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Gibson and Römmele, 2009 ).
According to the decision-theoretic model by Cox (1999) , the amount of effort parties devote to mobilization in a particular district depends jointly on three things: European election and the 2011 national election in Spain, the first of these translations, mainly a function of the quality of parties' links to social groups, is constant. Similarly, as no executive is selected in European elections and the informal rule is that all the portfolios are for the winner in national elections, the third translation is irrelevant in our case. Consequently, given that the only difference between the two elections is the electoral system, in particular district magnitude and the number of districts, the impact of how votes translate into seats on mobilization can be perfectly estimated. In other words, the 'all else equal' assumption is not hypothetical, but a fact.
When changing from a single national district (in the European election) to a districted electoral system (in the national election), the incentives for mobilization clearly differ. First, in the European election the payoff in seats of any given increment of votes as a consequence of mobilization efforts is exactly the same everywhere.
Accordingly, parties will invest more heavily in the most populated areas/provinces given that they can get more votes there. How concentrated mobilizational efforts (i.e., visits by party leaders) were on some particular provinces will depend on the amount of resources parties have, whether the impact of the visits of party leaders on the vote was linear or not, or the voters' visit saturation threshold. In the national election, the number of individuals entitled to vote in each province (i.e., the number of seats to be allocated in the district) also matter. However, party mobilization will be less driven by this variable as the rate at which a mobilizing party gains seats when it gains more votes differ across districts: the closer the local race or, in other words, when there are marginal seats, the higher the chance that mobilizational efforts could make a difference. Additionally, it can be hypothesized that if districts are large, party mobilization will be especially sensitive to close races. That is, a significant interaction between district-level competitiveness and district magnitude/population is suggested.
Second, the impact of district-level population should be lower and the crosssectional variance in campaign efforts should be higher in districted electoral systems than when using a single national district also due to the higher number of districts in the former. As Cox (1999: 398-9) Finally, the impact of the number of individuals entitled to vote in provinces is also (marginally) conditioned by how well apportioned electoral systems are. All else equal, if the population of provinces is exactly the same in electoral systems using a single national district than in districted electoral systems (i.e., both electoral systems are perfectly apportioned), the rate at which a mobilizing party gains seats in a given province when it gains more votes is equal. However, when there is a significant malapportionment in a districted electoral system and malapportionment favours small districts at the expense of large districts, as it normally happens (Samuels and Snyder, 2001 ) the rate will be higher in large provinces and lower in small provinces in
European elections in comparison with national elections.
To see this point, imagine a country divided into four provinces, A, B, C and D and suppose that the 10, 20, 30 and 40 percent of the population, respectively, lives in each one of them. In national elections the four provinces are the districts while in
European elections there is a single national district. If the system is perfectlyapportioned in national elections, the 10 percent of the seats will be elected in A, the 20 percent in B and so on. All else equal (turnout or local competitiveness, for instance), when parties have to decide which provinces will be visited by the party leader in
European and national elections, the incentives are exactly the same in both elections:
votes are translated into seats exactly in the same way. Suppose now that the system is malapportioned in national elections (systems using a single national district are perfectly apportioned by definition) and then the votes of some citizens weigh more than the votes of other citizens. For instance, the 15 percent of the seats will be elected in A, the 25 percent in B, the 25 percent in C, and the 35 percent in D. In this scenario parties face a stronger incentive to invest their resources in small districts in national elections than in the previous one, while in European elections the situation has not varied. In the unlikely scenario that large districts were favoured by malapportionment in national elections, the incentive structure would be the inverse than when malapportioment favours small districts.
All these arguments connecting mobilization strategies and electoral systems, based on a rational choice institutionalist approach, are challenged by what can be denominated as the 'party-centred' approach. As Hopkin (2009: 195) argues, institutional changes are mediated by parties' internal dynamics at their inception, and consequently the effects of these changes on party behaviour may be limited due to the inertias of long-standing party organizational arrangements. The empirical evidence provided by Denemark (2003: 615) strongly supports this crucial role of organizations and the idea that parties are not unitary actors. As he explains when studying the impact of electoral reform in New Zealand, "while the party elites were aware well before the campaign began of the need to embrace new tactics to maximize party list votes, the first MMP election in 1996 reflected important residues of the FPP mindset … Every party encountered significant resistance from local candidates to priority being given to campaigning for party list votes. … the patterns of constituency-level activities in the first election campaign under MMP reflected the important influence of inertia amongst the various political actors involved". Therefore, it could be hypothesized that parties' mobilizational strategies hardly respond to the incentives provided by electoral systems, at least in the short term, due to the pressures of local organizations.
On the basis of the previous discussion, the relationship between electoral systems and the frequency of visits to each province by party leaders can be formulated as follows: 
Data and methods
The As can be seen in Table 1 , the number of visits to districts in the 2011 Lower
House election (the PSOE, 26; the PP, 22) is higher than in the 2009 European election (the PSOE, 19; the PP, 23) for the PSOE, but lower for the PP. The variable ranges from 0 to 2 for the PSOE and from 0 to 2 for the PP in the national election, and from 0 to 5 for the PSOE and from 0 to 8 for the PP in the European election.
7 Viability means being the expected winner of a seat in a district or at least the expected first loser (Cox, 1997) . 8 Additionally, the comparison would be noisy as in European election some subnational parties join an alliance, while in national elections they enter alone.
In the quantitative analysis, given that the dependent variable is far from having an unbounded, symmetric, bell-shaped distribution, Poisson regression is usually regarded as an appropriate approach for analyzing variables measuring the number of times a particular event occurs (King, 1989) . As Poisson regression is more demanding than OLS in terms of the number of observations, observations for the PP and the PSOE and/or European and national elections have been merged in the models.
The four independent variables have been operationalized as follows: organization and the extent to which they can lobby in electoral campaign to count on the visit of party leader 11 . The expected sign of the variable is positive.
-Finally, to test some interactions, a dummy variable, European election, that equals 1 for provinces in the 2009 European election and 0 for provinces in the 2011 Lower House election, has been defined. The data used to test the hypotheses in the qualitative analysis were collected through a series of semi-structured face to face interviews with the campaign managers of the four largest national parties, the PSOE, the PP, the post-communist United Left 12 The fact that the number of visits of the PP leader was higher in the 2009 European elections than in the 20111 Lower House election rejects that the difference between elections was just an expression of the well known second-order election model. That is, the lower importance of European elections is not correlated with a lower number of visits for both parties. Table 2 . In the first model, apart from the constant, Delegates is statistically significant at the 0.001 level and has the expected positive sign: the higher the number of delegates a province sent to the National Congress, the higher the probability of being visited by the national leader.
The dummy variable identifying provinces in the European election is not statistically significant. That is, controlling for the number of delegates, the number of visits does not depend on the type of the election. These findings strongly support the crucial role of local organizations when designing campaign strategies, as our fourth hypothesis suggests. However, given that Delegates and Population are very strongly correlated, 0.81, it is not possible to reject that the number of delegates at the province level simply captures the impact of the number of entitled voters 14 .
Not surprisingly, when replacing Delegates with Population in the second model, Population is also statistically significant at the 0.001 level and has the expected positive sign: the higher the number of entitled voters in a province, the higher the probability of being visited by the national leader. The fit of the second model is slightly better than in the first one, suggesting that Population and not Delegates is the most relevant variable. Which of these two variables is the most relevant has to be clarified with the interviews with the campaign managers. The dummy variable identifying provinces in the European election is again not statistically significant. The campaign architect for the PSOE agreed, saying, "There are always districts where you have to devote an especial effort. We have electoral maps where we can determine which are the preferential electoral districts. We have done this throughout the campaign in what we have called 'electoral cartography'. It is the electoral cartography that determines in which districts devoting a concrete effort could allow us to maintain the same electoral result. We use electoral cartography especially in what concerns the party mobilization, the distribution of publicity and in determining where efforts have to be devoted in order to perform a campaign the more close as possible to the people." And consequently, "in national elections you go to those districts where you can defend, maintain or increase a given electoral result -which depends on the electoral expectations of the party … On the contrary, in European elections our mobilization exclusively depends on the population. In Huelva for instance we were not expecting to hold a meeting but eventually we went there the last day of campaign because diary polls were telling us that in Huelva [5 seats] support was decreasing. In Huelva, in case of having a single nationwide constituency, we wouldn't have gone there." Similarly, the campaign manager for the IU put it this way: "We devoted large amounts of resources to the districts of Seville, Valencia, Asturias, Malaga, Cadiz and Alicante, where we had real chances to get our first seat. In Barcelona and Madrid surveys were pointing that we had the two first representatives guaranteed so that we dedicated special efforts to gain the third seat in each of the districts … Particularly, the rank of the efforts devoted during the campaign was the following: 1st, Seville; 2nd, Madrid; 3rd, Barcelona, 4th, Valencia; 5th, Asturias; 6th, Malaga; 7th, Cadiz; and 8th Alicante. And in the last days of the campaign we put two advertisements in local newspapers in Alicante and Malaga since we realised that we were very close to get a seat. In the remaining districts the party spends very few resources since we don't have any chance of obtaining representation. In these cases instead of sending the leader of the party, Cayo Lara, to hold a meeting we send another person from the party, and at the end the amount of money that we devote to these districts is very low." Specifically, we have found that the variance in the number of visits by the party leaders will be higher in districted electoral systems than in electoral systems with a single national district. And, the number of visits by the party leaders will be higher, the higher the population of eligible voters in each province, in electoral systems with a single national district than in a districted electoral system. Lastly, we have found that the closer the district electoral race and the higher the population in that district, then the more frequent the visits from the leaders will be, in a districted electoral system. According to interviews, local organization does not seem to be particularly relevant in party mobilization strategies.
In sum, political party strategies, such as campaign resource-allocation, is conditioned by the number of districts and the district population, and future crossnational studies should control for this variation, when examining the effectiveness of party strategies, for example.
Using the data on party leader visits could also be a useful tool for measuring election interest in districts, using panel surveys. And, how might the number and variation of party leader visits change within a campaign? If we assume that this might change according to developments in the campaign, such as polling data indicating a steep increase or decrease in support, or region-specific issues coming to the fore, then this might be a worthy investigation.
How does our evidence hold up when applied to other countries with different electoral systems? Given the huge differences between electoral systems in national and European elections within EU countries, a cross-national test in EU countries could better demonstrate the validity of our results.
